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It Must be True – But How Can it Be?
Some Remarks on Panpsychism and
Mental Composition
PIERFRANCESCO BASILE
Abstract
Although panpsychism has had a very long history, one that goes back to the very
origin of western philosophy, its force has only recently been appreciated by analytic
philosophers of mind. And even if many still reject the theory as utterly absurd,
others have argued that it is the only genuine form of physicalism. This paper exam-
ines the case for panpsychism and argues that there are at least good prima facie
reasons for taking it seriously. In a second step, the paper discusses the main diffi-
culty the theory has to face, the ‘composition problem’. This is the problem of
explaining how the primitive experiences that are supposed to exist at the ultimate
level of reality could give rise to the unified experience of a human being. What
assumptions as to the nature of experience generate the composition problem? Is
mental composition impossible in principle or do we simply lack at present any
understanding of phenomenal parts and wholes?
1. Introduction
Analytical philosophy of mind has recently witnessed a revival of
interest in the old-fashioned doctrine of panpsychism – the view
that experience is a pervasive feature of reality. The doctrine is not
uncontroversial; while some embrace it almost enthusiastically,
others reject it as outrageously absurd. On the one hand, there are
supporters like David Skrbina, who argues that ‘panpsychism…
offers resolutions to mind-body problems that dualism and material-
ism find intractable’.1 On the other end of the scale, one finds pitiless
critics like ColinMcGinn, who compares panpsychism unfavourably
with Cartesian dualism and belief in divine providence, arguing that
the theory is not even a form of supernaturalism – it is ‘merely
extravagant’.2
As it will be argued, the right attitude should be neither one of con-
demnation nor one of uncritical endorsement. There are wholly
1 D. Skrbina, Panpsychism in the West (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT
Press, 2005), 4; my emphasis.
2 C. McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a
Resolution (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 2n.
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cogent lines of reasoning conducive to it; at the same time, its viability
is threatened by a few as yet unanswered questions. To put it in a way
more favourable to the panpsychist: the doctrine cannot be taken to
provide a fully satisfactory explanation of the place of consciousness
in nature; it does have its own strengths, however, and does therefore
deserve a fair hearing.
2. Physics, Metaphysics, Commonsense
John Searle provides a brief criticism of panpsychism in his book of
2004,Mind: ABrief Introduction. His assessment is as good a point of
departure for an evaluation as one could possibly wish. The present
paper can be read as a response to what he says there:
Panpsychism is the view that consciousness is everywhere. This
view is seldom stated explicitly, but it is in several authors par-
ticularly among the mysterians who think that if we are going
to explain consciousness in terms of microprocesses, then,
somehow or other, some form of consciousness must already be
present in themicroprocesses.…On this view, everything is con-
scious to some degree. In giving an example of the ubiquity of
consciousness, Chalmers eloquently describes what it might be
like to be a conscious thermostat.3
After this brief – and hardly sympathetic – characterization of the
theory, Searle launches his attack:
Aside from its inherent implausibility, panpsychism has the
additional demerit of being incoherent. I do not see any way
that it can cope with the problem of the unity of consciousness.
… If the thermostat is conscious, how about the parts of the
thermostat? Is there a separate consciousness to each screw?
Each molecule? If so, how does their consciousness relate to the
consciousness of the whole thermostat? And if not, what is the
principle that makes the thermostat the unit of consciousness
and not the parts of the thermostat or the whole heating system
of which the thermostat is a part or the building in which the
heating system exists?4
3 J. Searle, Mind: A Brief Introduction (Oxford-New York: Oxford
University Press, 2004), 149–50.
4 Ibid., 150.
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This passage nicely summarizes what can be said – and what has in
fact been said – against panpsychism; one will have to disentangle,
however, Searle’s misunderstandings from his genuine insights.
Let’s begin with what is most obviously unsatisfactory, namely his
rejection of panpsychism on the ground of its ‘inherent
implausibility’.
Charges of implausibility are notoriously hard to evaluate – by
what standards is the plausibility of a philosophical theory to be
tested? Searle does not say. The standard can hardly be common-
sense; if it were, this would suffice to reject all the –isms in the phil-
osophy of mind (perhaps, only such a vituperated doctrine as
Cartesian dualism would avoid such a wholesale condemnation!).
Be that as it may, it is difficult to see why panpsychism should be
regarded as more absurd than any of the existing forms of material-
ism, which enjoy on the contrary a very wide acceptance.
Is it ‘science’, then, that provides the required standard? The
problem here is that it is unclear what this is supposed to mean.
Should one include, say, physics, chemistry, biology, or only one of
these? And why exactly is science supposed to rule out panpsychism?
Appeals to ‘our best scientific theories’ are common in the philosophy
of mind, yet quite often they are little more than empty slogans: I
suspect that there is more than a grain of truth in Ross and
Ladyman’s critique of recent works in analytic philosophy of mind
as being based upon a ‘pseudo-scientific metaphysics’.5
Most importantly, panpsychists argue that natural science does not
make any positive claim about the intrinsic nature of reality; rather,
they claim that science limits itself to the study of the formal proper-
ties of the investigated objects. As Russell says with regard to our
knowledge of matter:
[I]t is only mathematical properties that we can discover… The
physical world is only known as regards certain abstract features
of its space-time structure – features which, because of their
abstractness, do not suffice to show whether the physical world
is, or is not, different in its intrinsic character from the world
of mind.6
5 D. Ross and J. Ladyman (with D. Spurrett and J. Collier), Every
Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007), 18–27.
6 B. Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (London:
Routledge, 1948), 240.
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Thus, so the argument goes, there cannot possibly be anything in
science that contradicts panpsychism: ‘physics’ and ‘meta-physics’
operate at distinct explanatory levels. True, the notion that science
has nothing to say about the ultimate nature of things is not an
obvious one, but the argument needs to be addressed in its own
terms – a generic appeal to implausibility will not suffice.
Another noteworthy feature of the passage is Searle’s contention
that panpsychism is ‘seldom stated explicitly’. Doesn’t this suggest
that panpsychists are a little dishonest, afraid, as it were, to clearly
come into the fore? This can’t be right; the list of philosophers
explicitly committed to some form of panpsychism is not as brief as
Searle would make us believe. The doctrine has an impressive
history, one which includes names as venerable as those of
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Benedict de Spinoza, Charles Sanders
Peirce, William James, and Alfred North Whitehead. In recent
times, the likes of philosophers such as David Chalmers, William
Seager and Thomas Nagel have argued that it is a hypothesis worth
contemplating. And it has been forcefully advocated by Charles
Hartshorne, David Ray Griffin, David Skrbina, Galen Strawson,
and Timothy Sprigge.
Ipse dixit? This is not, of course, an appeal to authority; nor is it
simply a pedantic attempt at setting the record straight. The point
is that panpsychism is not to be viewed as an historical anomaly; it
should not, therefore, be dismissed as a philosophical eccentricity.
3. The Ubiquity of Experience
This might not be enough to dispel the suspicion that the theory is
implausible – if not even obviously absurd. Searle touches upon a
serious problem at the very end of the quoted passage. What he
has in mind is the specific version of panpsychism that has been ten-
tatively advocated by David Chalmers in The Conscious Mind. On
this version of the theory, a thermostat has a claim to be regarded
as sentient. But a thermostat is made up of parts (the screws,
the molecules), and is itself part of larger complexes (the whole
heating system, the building). Quite rightly, Searle asks why only
the thermostat should be regarded as sentient. Where – and, most
importantly, how – do we draw the line between the sentient and
the non-sentient?
In the case of Chalmers’ version of panpsychism, the answer is
straightforward. Since he speculates that experience might be
linked with information, whatever can be regarded as an information
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system could also be regarded as endowedwith experiences.7 The real
issue here is to account for the nature of the link that connects infor-
mation and experience; nothing is truly explained by arguing that
experience and information are like the two sides of a manuscript –
recto and verso.
In general, two lines of response are available to the panpsychist.
(1) One is to ascribe experiences to everything that exists. In a
recent essay, David Skrbina argues that there is no difference in
kind between a human being and a rock (‘the rock experiences the
world, and we experience the world’), before going on to ascribe a
mental life to ‘all things that exist – from atoms and rocks, to tables
and chairs, to human beings, planets, and stars’. This is legitimate,
but it isn’t very satisfying; it simply doesn’t ring true that the
theory ‘finds justification in… empiricism’.8 There is nothing in
our experience that even slightly suggests that sticks and stones,
tables and chairs, planets and galaxies, are experiencing things. As
John Dewey recognized, ‘[t]here is no evidence that experience
occurs everywhere and everywhen’.9 On the contrary, at least in
some cases, our experience suggests (although it does not prove) the
opposite view. Stones are incapable of spontaneous movement and
reaction, which clearly demarcates them from those organisms –
such as human and non-human animals – to which we do not hesitate
to ascribe a conscious, experiential life. Although empirical obser-
vation does not show that sentience is not ubiquitous, we should
treat its deliverances as we are supposed to treat a literary text –
that is to say, we should not read too much into them.
This critique differs radically from Wittgenstein’s remark in the
Philosophical Investigations: ‘Could one imagine a stone’s having con-
sciousness? And if anyone can do so – why should that not merely
prove that such image-mongery is of no interest to us?’10 The point
is not that a panpsychism that goes so far as to ascribe mental states
to such things as sticks and stones would be meaningless; we can
make some sense of such a proposal. Simply, such a version of
7 D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Oxford-New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 293.
8 D. Skrbina, ‘Transcending Consciousness: Thoughts on a Universal
Conception of Mind’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 16:5 (2009), 81
and 84.
9 J. Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover, 1958), 3a.
10 L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, edited by G. E. M.
Anscombe and R. Rhees (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), §390.
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panpsychism would assume more than is empirically warranted11
and, arguably, more than is needed for explanatory purposes.
(2) This becomes clearer if one considers the other option which
remains open to the panpsychist. Specifically, it is possible to differ-
entiate between wholes which, considered as such, are capable of sen-
tience from wholes which, considered as such, are deprived of
experience. The panpsychist might then choose to qualify the
notion that experience is ubiquitous by making the following propo-
sal (with ‘E’ and ‘NE’ standing for ‘experiential’ and ‘non-experien-
tial’ respectively):
[A] All ultimate constituents of reality are sentient.
[B] When such ultimates are grouped in certain special ways –
say, the E-ways – they give rise to complexes that are themselves
sentient.
[C]When they are grouped in different ways – say, theNE-ways –
they give rise to complexes that are themselves insentient.
This would not be implausible. There is no reason to believe that a
complex must be sentient solely because its parts are; this would be
an instance of the fallacy of composition. Conversely, there is no
reason to believe that there is no experience in the parts, solely
because the whole is not itself an experiencing thing; this would be
an instance of the fallacy of division. There is nothing that suggests per-
manence and immovability more vividly than a solid piece of rock, yet
we have no difficulty in accepting the scientific description of it as com-
posed of vibrating, energizing particles. It is at least conceivable that the
same could be true of the sentient/insentient distinction.
In order to be entitled to hold a position of this sort, however, the
panpsychist must be able to explain what ‘principle’ accounts for the
fact that only certain wholes posses a unified consciousness. One
would need a clear account of the distinction between those ways of
organization that give rise to sentient wholes (the E-ways) and
11 One truly major thinker who went so far as to ascribe experiences to
all things is Spinoza. It is significant that this claim was not established
empirically, but was inferred as a corollary of a general metaphysical
theory established on a priori grounds. Specifically, given his substance
metaphysics and the parallelism that goes with it, every mode of extension
has its counterpart in a mode of thought. Thus, there must be of necessity
a mental correlate to each physical thing. His metaphysical principles, he
argues, ‘are completely general and do not pertain more to man than to
other individuals, all of which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless
animate’. B. Spinoza, Ethics, edited and translated by E. Curley (London:
Penguin Books, 1994), 2p13.
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those that do not (theNE-ways). Such a theory would be less difficult
to digest, but it would be a hard task towork it out. A speculative phi-
losopher such as Whitehead appears at times to be proposing a tre-
mendously intricate taxonomy of complex individuals, although
only in a sketchymanner.12 To the best ofmy knowledge, the detailed
articulation of such a theory has yet to be provided.
4. The Heterogeneity Problem
The above considerations show that the panpsychist need not be com-
mitted to the view that apparently inert objects such as rocks or ther-
mostats have experiences. In order to dispel fully the suspicion that
the theory is absurd, however, one has to consider the reasons in its
support. Searle condemns the view as a form of ‘mysterianism’ but
doesn’t make the slightest effort to explain why very intelligent phi-
losophers should have come to entertain such an apparently strange
idea in the first place.
Although a variety of arguments has been advanced over the cen-
turies, the one that is likely to get a hearing in the current philosophi-
cal climate pivots upon the notion of emergence. James provides a
vivid illustration of the perplexity that grounds the panpsychist’s
case in his Principles of Psychology:
The point which as evolutionists we are bound to hold fast to is
that all the new forms of being that make their appearance are
really nothing more than results of the redistribution of the orig-
inal and unchanging materials. The self-same atoms which,
chaotically dispersed, made the nebula, now, jammed and tem-
porarily caught in peculiar positions, form our brains; and the
‘evolution’ of the brains, if understood, would be simply the
account of how the atoms came to be so caught and jammed.
In this story no new natures, no factors not present at the begin-
ning, are introduced at any later stage.
But with the dawn of consciousness an entirely new nature
seems to slip in, something whereof the potency was not given
in the mere outward atoms of the original chaos.13
12 A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, cor-
rected edition by D. R. Griffin and D. W. Sherburne (New York: The
Free Press, 1978), 83–109.
13 W. James, The Principles of Psychology, Vol. I. (New York: Dover,
1950), 146.
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The obvious conclusion is that in an evolutionary universe experience
must be present from the very beginning. One of Russell’s teachers at
Cambridge, James Ward, argued as follows:
It is interesting… to notice that in the support which it lends to
pampsychist views the theory of evolution seems likely to have an
effect on science the precise opposite of that which it exercised at
first. That was a leveling down, this will be a leveling up. At first
it appeared as if man were only to be linked with the ape, now it
would seem that the atom, if reality at all, may be linked with
man.14
This is a truly remarkable passage and its power should not pass
unnoticed. Even today – and not solely in the popular press – evol-
ution is associated with a materialistic conception of reality; in ortho-
dox circles, it is even rejected on this very ground. If Ward is right,
however, then the link between evolution and materialism might
not be as close as we are accustomed to think. The theory of evolution
need not necessarily degrade consciousness, for it might spiritualize
matter.
In remarking that the generation of the experiential from the non-
experiential would involve a break of evolutionary continuity, James
andWard are raising the ‘heterogeneity problem’. This is a difficulty
Galen Strawson has recently stated in very clear terms.15 As he puts
it, the problem arises for a philosopher inclined to hold the following
two theses (with ‘NE’ and ‘RE’ standing for ‘non-experiential’ and
‘real physicalism’ respectively):
[NE] physical stuff is, in itself, in its fundamental nature, some-
thing wholly and utterly non-experiential.
[RP] experience is a real concrete phenomenon and every real
concrete phenomenon is physical.
The problemhere is to reconcile the belief thatmental phenomena are
physical, [RP], with our deep ingrained intuition that physical stuff
14 J. Ward, ‘Mechanism and Morals: The World of Science and the
World of History’ in Essays in Philosophy: with a Memoir by Olwen Ward
Campell, edited by W. R. Sorley and G. F. Stout (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1927), 247.
15 G. Strawson, ‘Real Materialism: Why Physicalism Entails
Panpsychism’ in Consciousness and its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism
Entail Panpsychism?, edited by A. Freeman (Exeter: Imprint Academic,
2006), 12–21.
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isn’t experiential, [NE]. Most philosophers would surely wish to
believe both. Yet it is not easy to see how they could be entitled to
do so, for if [RP] is true, then some real things are both physical
and experiential, which is what [NE] denies.
The way out of this impasse is supposed to be provided by the
notion of emergence. When purely physical stuff achieves a certain
degree of complexity in its organization, then new properties –
experiential properties – come into existence. In this way, it becomes
possible to hold that all physical stuff is, in its fundamental nature,
non-experiential [NE], without having to deny that experiential
phenomena are wholly physical [RP], since they are now conceived
as the outcome of wholly natural processes. In a book entitled Mind
and Emergence, for example, Philip Clayton characterizes emergence
as ‘the view that new and unpredictable phenomena are naturally
produced by interactions in nature’.16 But is emergence an intelligible
notion? On the face of it, the ‘experiential’ and the ‘non-experiential’
are utterly different categories of being: how could the purely
physical, in the sense of the non-experiential, bring the experiential
into existence? This does look like a miraculous feat – a kind of
unfathomable creatio ex nihilo. As John Locke forcefully makes the
point (although in a different argumentative setting): ‘it is as impos-
sible that incogitative matter should produce a cogitative being as that
nothing, or the negation of all being, should produce a positive being
or matter’.17
This is the whole point on which the panpsychist rests his case. If
the notion of brute emergence is rejected, then one will be brought
back to the original contradiction and will have to reconsider either
[RP] or [NE]. One way to abandon [RP] would be to deny the
reality of mental phenomena and embrace eliminative materialism.
But the very existence of experiences does seem difficult to deny –
what is more real than the pains I feel when hitting my foot against
the table? Nor can it be that they simply appear to be, but are really
not: since merely to appear is already to be a part of reality. (If
there is a theory that has a fair claim to be regarded as an historical
anomaly, isn’t this eliminative materialism?)
Alternatively, one might hold that mental phenomena are real
while at the same time reject the notion that they are physical. But
this would yield a form of supernaturalism and a bifurcation of
16 P. Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), vi; my emphasis.
17 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, abridged and edited by
John W. Yolton (London: Dent, 1994), IV. X. 11.
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reality into a material and a mental world. This is unsatisfactory,
because the mental is just as natural as the material. Moreover, this
solution reopens the vexed question: how could these two worlds
intermingle and constitute the single unified universe in which we
live? (If there is anything uncontroversial in the philosophy of
mind, this is the notion that an understanding of mind’s place in
nature requires a monistic ontology, that is, one that recognizes only
a single kind of basic stuff.)
It is tempting, at this point – the temptation is a strong one, and
should be appreciated as such – to succumb to the siren song and
to take the radical step of dropping [NE] out of board:
[¬NE] physical stuff is, in itself, in its fundamental nature, NOT
something wholly and utterly non-experiential.
This is tantamount to accepting some form of panpsychism. Isn’t
there any way to resist this conclusion? I admit that the notion of
radical emergence is a difficult one. Strawson observes that, if brute
emergence were possible, then we couldn’t rule out other kinds of
miraculous transitions such as the emergence of concrete phenomena
from abstract ones.18 I do not know how to prove that miracles do not
occur; to admit that they do, however, is to give up on the attempt to
understand consciousness’ place in nature.
At this juncture, the following objection is likely to arise: ‘Sooner
or later, science will explain the emergence of the experiential out of
the non-experiential: why, then, not suspend judgment and see what
science will bring?’19 This would be to miss the force of the panpsy-
chist’s case. We do not need to wait for science to dispel the riddle.
The panpsychist does not claim that we do not know at present how
to explain brute emergence; rather, the claim is that we already
know that such a radical form of emergence is impossible – or, alter-
natively, that if brute emergence is real, then it is not something we
can possibly understand.
Note that this is not to deny that sciencemight one day explain con-
sciousness’ place in nature. If it will, however, this will be at the price
of abandoning the notion of insentient matter and the conception of
emergence that goes with it. To see this is to recognize that the diffi-
culty is not empirical, but conceptual – the gap between the
18 Ibid., 19; for a similar point, see T. Nagel, ‘Panpsychism’ in Mortal
Questions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 194.
19 See P. Simons, ‘The Seeds of Experience’ in A. Freeman (ed.),
Consciousness and its Place in Nature, op. cit., 148–49, for an objection
along these lines.
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experiential and the non-experiential is a logical one: mere acquisition
of novel empirical data would not help unless one reframes the con-
cepts that are used to interpret those data. Otherwise put, it is our
current concept of matter as that which is wholly and utterly non-experi-
ential which makes it impossible to understand how mind, the experien-
tial, could emerge from it. Surely, the request that we revise our
ordinary conception of matter is a radical one, but it is much less
drastic than eliminative materialism or Colin McGinn’s skeptical
suggestion that there is something about our cognitive endowments
that makes it impossible in principle to solve the mind-body
problem.20
Thus, what seems worthy of consideration at this point is whether
there is a way of avoiding panpsychismwhile still rejecting the notion of
a brute emergence of the experiential from the non-experiential. Neutral
monism might seem to offer a way of escape. Why not argue that rea-
lity’s basic stuff is neithermental nor physical, and yet it is the ground
out of which both experiential and non-experiential properties orig-
inate? On closer examination, one easily sees why this solution
wouldn’t do. If one rejects emergence on the ground of the hetero-
geneity problem, then one is inevitably committed to saying that
mental properties cannot originate from a wholly non-mental
source. The neutral substratum will have to possess, if not full-
blown mental properties, at least some proto-experiential features;
again, this is tantamount to admitting that some form of panpsychism
must be true – that the seeds of experience lie deep in the ultimate
nature of things.
Nevertheless, the attempt to avoid the panpsychist option by
adopting neutral monism is not wholly misguided. The intuition
that animates that proposal is that, at an ultimate level of explanation,
realitymight not be adequately described in terms of the twin notions
of ‘experiential’ (‘mental’) and ‘non-experiential’ (‘physical’).
Perhaps one does not really have to choose between [NE] and
[RP]? They could both be false in that they are an inadequate way
to set up the stage in the first place.
This seems to be the solution recently favored by Colin McGinn:
‘The only way out of this’ – he says – ‘is to hold out the hope of a
third level of description… Brains have properties beyond those of
20 As he has it, ‘we are cut off by our very cognitive constitution from
achieving a conception of that natural property of the brain (or of conscious-
ness) that accounts for the psychophysical link…the felt mystery comes from
our own cognitive limitations, not from any objective eeriness in the world’.
C. McGinn, ‘Can we solve the mind-body problem?’,Mind 98 (1989), 359.
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experience and those of basic physics and biology. These properties
might then mediate between the other two sorts of property, offering
some sort of unification of all three levels’.21 On this view, one would
have to redesign the conceptual landscape in which the whole debate
takes place. Significantly, McGinn talks of a mere ‘hope’ that there
might be such a ‘third level of description’; the existence of such a
level is nothing more than a logical possibility. Thomas Nagel goes
a step further along this path, as he speculates that we might find
the problem of consciousness intractable simply because we lack
the adequate conceptual categories: ‘We need entirely new intellec-
tual tools, and it is precisely by reflection on what appears imposs-
ible – like the generation of mind out of the recombination of
matter – that we will be forced to create such tools’.22
Onewould not hold to such a hope or aim at such grand conceptual
revision, however, unless one had strong reasons for rejecting panp-
sychism. One main difficulty of the theory will be considered pre-
sently. For the time being, it should be emphasized that the
argument based upon the heterogeneity problem is a powerful one.
‘I suspect’, Timothy Sprigge wrote, ‘that our reason for believing
that something is inherently impossible must always lie in the fact
that we find it more and more difficult to conceive of it the more
we understand the nature of the elements we are instructed to
combine…That is, the nearer we approach intuitive fulfillment of
the meaning of the expression said to express it the more we feel
baffled’.23 On the face of it, brute emergence looks like magic –
isn’t it so? The burden of proof lies on the emergentist here.
5. Mental Composition
Searle raises a serious question when he says that panpsychism can’t
‘cope with the problem of the unity of consciousness’. On the panp-
sychist view, he asks, how do the parts of a sentient whole ‘relate to
the consciousness of the whole’? For the sake of illustration, let’s
assume that the human brain (instead of Chalmers’ thermostat) is
composed of parts that are either sentient or wholly experiential in
21 C. McGinn, ‘Hard Questions. Comments on Galen Strawson’ in
A. Freeman (ed.), Consciousness and its Place in Nature, op. cit., 98.
22 T. Nagel,The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986), 52.
23 T. L. S. Sprigge, The Vindication of Absolute Idealism (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1983), 128.
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nature. Searle’s question now becomes: how do the lesser conscious-
nesses entering in the constitution of the brain coalesce so as to form
the unified consciousness of a human being?
This well-known difficulty was raised by James in his Principles of
Psychology. In that book, he compared the experiences in the neurons
with the thoughts of several persons in a row:
Take a sentence of a dozen words, and take twelve men and tell to
each one word. Then stand the men in a row or jam them in a
bunch, and let each think of his word as intently as he will;
nowhere there will be a consciousness of the whole sentence.24
More recently, Philip Goff has made the example of a big pain com-
posed of several little pains, as it were, by way of addition:
Consider a physical ultimate that feels slightly pained, call it
LITTLE PAIN 1. Consider then such slightly pained ultimates,
LITTLE PAIN 1, LITTLE PAIN 2, etc., coming together to
constitute a severely pained macroscopic thing, call it BIG
PAIN. The pained-ness of each of the ultimates comes together
to constitute the pained-ness of BIG PAIN: an entity that feels
ten times the pain of each LITTLE PAIN. The severe pained-
ness of BIG PAIN is wholly constituted by the slight pained-
ness of all the LITTLE PAINS.25
Clearly, a collection of thoughts about single words does not amount
to a single thought about a whole sentence; by the same token, an
assemblage of little pains is not the same as a big pain, whose quali-
tative feel differs from that of any of its constituents or of all of them
collectively. This is uncontroversial; equally uncontroversial, the
transition from the experiences in the neurons to the human experi-
ence cannot be accepted as a brute contingency, but stands itself in
need of explanation. This is no trivial point. Should this transition
prove to be inexplicable, one will have to conclude that panpsychism
is in no better position than any of the alternatives examined in the
previous section, as it would face its own version of the problem of
emergence.
But do we know that such a transition – from the low-level experi-
ences to the higher human experience – cannot possibly take place?
On the basis of what has been said so far, there is no reason to construe
the composition problem as a reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine of
24 W. James, The Principles of Psychology, op. cit., 160.
25 P. Goff, ‘Experiences Don’t Sum’ in A. Freeman (ed.),Consciousness
and its Place in Nature, op. cit., 57.
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mental combination and, by implication, of panpsychism.
Specifically, the panpsychist need not be committed to the view
that the lesser selves should bring about a larger consciousness in
the same way in which, say, mosaic pieces come together to form
the larger picture. Their mode of combination must be of an
altogether different type. Surely, there is nothing in either Searle’s
or Goff’s passages to warrant their contention that panpsychism is
incoherent.
Quite recently, Goff himself has recognized that, as stated above,
the criticism does not suffice to show that mental composition is
impossible in principle: ‘Contrary to views I have expressed in
earlier work’ – he now writes – ‘I believe that the panpsychist can
make good sense of subjects of experience summing, and hence can
get round the combination problem’.26 As against this, I do think
that the notion of mental composition poses a very hard challenge
for panpsychism. To see why this is so, however, an attempt must
be made to formulate the problem in more precise terms.
6. Why is There a Problem?
What assumptions about the nature of experience generate the
problem? Strangely enough, this question is rarely asked; it just
seems to be taken for granted that we have an adequate grasp of the dif-
ficulty at issue. But consider the two passages quoted above. James’
question is about intentionality – how could mental events, each of
which has a different intentional object (a single word), generate a
mental event with a new intentional object (a whole sentence)? Goff’s
is about qualia – how could mental events, each of which has its own
‘what-is-it-like-feeling’, generate a mental event that has its own dis-
tinct phenomenology (the feel of a big pain as opposed to that of a
little one)? Without wishing to adjudicate the question as to the
nature of the relationship between the two alleged ‘marks’ of the
mental – ‘intentionality’ and ‘subjectivity’ – , it should be admitted
that it is not immediately clear that these questions are the very same
one or that the solution to the one will entail the solution to the other.
Let’s here consider the problem in terms of qualia. After all, it is
the subjective, qualitative dimension of conscious experience that
26 P. Goff, ‘Can the panpsychist get around the combination problem?’
in D. Skrbina (ed.), Mind that Abides: Panpsychism in the new millennium
(Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2009),
133.
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has led contemporary philosophers to reconsider the heterogeneity
problem, thus providing the motivation for panpsychism in the
first place.27 Once more, it is to James that we will turn for advice.
In his later work, A Pluralistic Universe, he provides a most interest-
ing evaluation of panpsychism. This is developed in the context of a
discussion of the philosophies of Gustav Fechner and Josiah Royce.
As James himself points out, however, what he says possesses a
broader philosophical significance and a general critique of panpsy-
chism can be extrapolated.28
Drawing freely from James’ exposition, the problemmight be con-
strued as depending upon a few assumptions as to the nature of our
experience:
PHENOMENAL ESSENTIALISM – this is the view that, for
an experience, to be is to feel a certain way. In the case of a pain, it
seems pointless to draw a distinction between what the pain is in
itself and theway it feels; the former –what the pain is ‘in itself’ –
is wholly exhausted by the latter – its qualitative, felt dimension.
As James forcefully puts it, in the case of experience, ‘appear-
ance’ and ‘reality’ are one and the same.29
Besides the idea that an experience is nothing over and above the
manner of its appearance – the idea that ‘a mental fact’ is ‘just what
it appears to be’30 – there is another assumption that needs to be
taken into account. This is one James would seem to endorse in the
Principles of Psychology:
PHENOMENAL HOLISM – this is the view that, within a
person’s total psychical whole, the nature of a single identifiable
experience (‘single’, in the sense that it can be counted as ‘one’) is
essentially determined by the other experiences occurring along-
side it – synchronically – within the whole.
This principle involves a rejection of the traditional atomistic view of
themind, one typically exemplified byHume’s notion of a perception
as a self-subsistent, substance-like entity that could, as a matter of
27 Another limitation, already implicit in what has been said so far, is
that the problemwill be discussed with respect to consciousness’ synchronic
unity, as opposed to its unity over time.
28 W. James, A Pluralistic Universe: Hibbert Lectures at Manchester
College on the Present Situation in Philosophy (London-Bombay-Calcutta:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1909), 192.
29 Ibid., 198–9.
30 Ibid., 200.
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sheer logical possibility, exist outside of the larger field of conscious-
ness in which it actually occurs.31 According to James, a person’s psy-
chical field at any one moment constitutes a non-decomposable
unity; its several contents are to be viewed as ‘aspects’mutually deter-
mining and interpenetrating each other rather than as ‘parts’ in any
literal sense of this word. James’ commitment to this view is implicit
in his remark that ‘each thought [a total moment of experience] is a
fresh organic unity’.32 The denomination ‘organic unity’ commonly
refers to a totality whose parts are internally related, such that the
nature of each essentially depends upon that of all others.
For the sake of illustration, imagine what it would be like to drink a
cup of coffee inNaples as opposed to drinking it in Edinburgh: isn’t it
plausible to think that the different atmospheres of the two cities (the
characteristically different colours, sounds, flavours etc. one experi-
ences there) would make a difference to the coffee’s taste? The two
tastes, as they occur in the total states ‘Coffee-in-Naples’ and
‘Coffee-in-Edinburgh’, would seem to be different – qualitatively,
and therefore also numerically – experiential occurrences.
Let’s now consider the relation between the mind and the brain. It
is unlikely that the panpsychist would want to reinstall the notion of
the soul as an entity separate from the brain and causally interacting
with it.Most likely, he is bound to speculate that the ‘largermind’ of a
human being is constituted by the ‘lesser minds’ of the neurons. This
would seem to require that an experience belonging to (or even
wholly constituting) a neuron’s lesser mind be also felt by the
larger subject which is the human mind. Such a view would
involve what James refers to as ‘the assumption that states of con-
sciousness… can separate and combine themselves freely, and keep
their own identity unchanged while forming parts of simultaneous
fields of experience of wider scope’.33 This underlying assumption
can be recast as follows:
THE SHARING PRINCIPLE – this is the view that an experi-
ence can simultaneously occur within two distinct psychical
wholes – i.e. the very same experience can be felt by two different
feelers, in this case, by the ‘lesser mind’ of the neuron and the
‘larger mind’ of the human being.
31 D. Hume, ATreatise of Human Nature, edited by D. F. Norton and
M. J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 137–8.
32 W. James, The Principles of Psychology, op. cit., 279n; see also 145
and 241.
33 W. James, A Pluralistic Universe, op. cit., 181.
108
Pierfrancesco Basile
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246110000044
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:08:19, subject to the Cambridge Core
Once these notions are accepted, it becomes clear that the notion of
mental combination involves a contradiction. If mental combination
is to be possible, an experience must be felt by two different subjects
while remaining numerically self-identical. But if the being of an
experience is wholly exhausted by the way it feels, then an experience
cannot be numerically the same while being felt by two different
feelers. So, it would seem, mental composition is an impossible
conception.
In order to see which options are actually open to a philosopher
faced which this difficulty, it might be helpful to derive the contra-
diction in a more formal way. If mental combination is possible,
then the same one experience, E, must be felt by the human mind
M as well as by the neuronal mind N. At the same time, according
to phenomenal essentialism, an experience is nothing but the way it
feels; hence, the following two theses must both be true:
[1] E=E-as-felt-within-N
[2] E=E-as-felt-within-M
But how can this be? SinceN andM are per hypothesis different, and
M is surely going to have a richer content than N, this implies:
[3] E-as-felt-within-N≠E-as-felt-within-M
By substitution of [1] and [2] in [3], one gets:
[4] E≠E
But this is a clear violation of the logic of identity! In order for mental
composition to be possible, an experience would then have to possess
two natures – it would have to be itself and yet another thing.
Surprisingly enough, James did not believe that the discovery of
this contradiction amounted to a refutation of panpsychism; influ-
enced by the then emerging philosophy of Henri Bergson, he chose
to reject the logic of identity as adequate to an understanding of
experience.34 This is not an option to be ridiculed, but it is not to
be welcomed either; ultimately, what one aims at in philosophy is
rational, conceptual understanding.
Thus, it would seem that the panpsychist will have to renounce one
of the principles involved in the derivation. Which one should he
choose? The most likely candidate is the idea that experiences can
be shared. This seems reasonable enough; after all, the privacy of
our experience – i.e. the fact that each of us is the only individual
who can possibly know what his or her experiences feel like – is a
34 Ibid., 212 and 214.
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commonplace of every-day life.35 Note that the point is not the epis-
temological one that we cannot knowwhat another person’s experience
feels like, but ontological: experiences are such that they cannot be felt
by more than one subject. And yet, to abandon the notion of a
‘sharing’ of experiences comes at a price; the panpsychist would
seem to require this notion in order to make sense of mental compo-
sition and thereby account for the relation between the mind and the
brain.
One final remark: it could be objected that the above argument
does not show that there is any problem in principle with sharing
across numerically distinct subjects if no other experiences were
going on. This is true but, I think, irrelevant to the present case; it
is only reasonable to assume that the human mind is a richer whole
of experience than the (alleged) mind of a single neuron. Still, the
question is important, as it suggests that there might be stronger
ways of arguing for the privacy of our experiences – that is, without
having to assume that there are differences in the subjects’ other
experienced contents and thereby without an appeal to the principle
of phenomenal holism. As a matter of fact, a closer look at the prin-
ciple reveals that it is not as evident as it might initially appear.
James says little to support phenomenal holism, and while there are
very obvious illustrations of it (a glass of wine has a better taste
when enjoyed in a pleasant surrounding), the principle does seem
somewhat implausible in other circumstances. Would the red of the
book’s cover in front of me have a different feel if I were not
hearing music at this moment? It is difficult to tell, but there is
room for scepticism here.36
7. Conclusion
Where does this leave us? Nagel has remarked that Cartesian dualism
‘is usually adopted on the ground that it must be true, and often
35 Using Samuel Alexander’s little known but very apt terminology,
‘knowing’ our experiences means here apprehending them by way of ‘enjoy-
ment’, simply by living through them as it were, rather than knowing them
as one knows an object of contemplation. See hisSpace, Time andDeity: The
Gifford Lectures at Glasgow, 1916–1918, Vol. I (London: MacMillan & Co.,
1924), xiv.
36 For a critical assessment of phenomenal holism, see B. Dainton,
Stream of Consciousness. Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience
(London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 181–213 and see his paper in
this volume.
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rejected on the ground that it can’t be true’.37 The same could now be
said of panpsychism, as the argument based upon the heterogeneity
problem is counterbalanced by the problem of mental composition.
Nagel’s own conclusion is that ‘panpsychism should be added to
the list of… hopelessly unacceptable solutions to the mind-body
problem’,38 but it would be premature to reject a doctrine supported
by such a strong argument; rather, the hope is that what has been said
might help to circumscribe the theory’s ‘logical space’ – the legitimate
area of argumentative manoeuvre for any attempt to make sense of
mental composition.
If the above considerations are sound, then there are at least two
requirements that any viable formulation of the theory must be
capable of satisfying:
[A] The panpsychist should reject the idea that larger experien-
tial wholes are brought into existence by way of simple addition
of lesser experiential realities; mental items must combine in a
way that is categorically different from the way in which stones
and bricks combine to form a house, or several pieces of a
puzzle to yield the whole picture. These simply aren’t the right
combinatory models. (This might seem an obvious point to
make; as it has been shown, however, it is also one that is easily
overlooked.)
[B] The panpsychist should fully acknowledge that experiences
are private. This means that the notion of mental composition
should not be construed as involving the idea that experiences
can be literally ‘shared’ – ‘owned’ as it were by two different sub-
jects. (To put it in idealistic terms: if the being of an experience is
wholly exhausted by its sentiri, no experience can preserve its
identity while felt by different feelers.)
Trivial as they might appear, these are severe constraints. Is there any
known version of panpsychism that satisfies these demands? The only
candidate that comes to mind is Leibniz’s theory of causally indepen-
dent monads. [A] The monads constituting our body do not sum up
by way of addition to give rise to the humanmind, which is a distinct,
separate individual. And while he contends that our individual minds
comprise an infinite number of unconscious petites perceptions,39
37 T. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, op. cit., 29.
38 T. Nagel, ‘Panpsychism’, op. cit., 193.
39 G. W. Leibniz, ‘Introduction to New Essays on the Human
Understanding’, in The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings,
edited and translated by R. Latta (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1898), 370.
111
It Must be True – But How Can it Be?
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246110000044
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:08:19, subject to the Cambridge Core
these are not to be thought of literally as ‘parts’ of our entire psychical
whole; on the contrary, our minds are Leibniz’s paradigmatic
examples of genuine units or indivisible substances. [B]
Furthermore, since monads are ‘windowless’, they do not literally
share their contents with any other monad; although all monads per-
ceive the same universe, each enjoys its own private mental world.
But wouldn’t a recurrence to a Leibnizian metaphysics of window-
less monads be a price too high even for a panpsychist to pay?
Fortunately, this question can be postponed. In view of the strength
of the panpsychist’s case, what is needed is more work on the compo-
sition problem. In the passage quoted at the very beginning of this
paper, Searle says that he cannot see ‘any way that it [panpsychism]
can cope with the problem of the unity of consciousness’.
Undeniably, the problem is a difficult one; I have argued in this
paper that – perhaps – there is a way. We lack at present a firm under-
standing of phenomenal parts and wholes, but – pace Searle (and Goff)
– it is equally true that we do not know that mental composition is imposs-
ible in principle. Compared with the ferocious intensity with which
other questions have been debated – such as, for example, mental cau-
sation or supervenience – this is an undeveloped area of research in
contemporary philosophy of mind.40
University of Bern, Switzerland
40 I would like to thank Leemon McHenry, Pauline Phemister and
Galen Strawson for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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